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ABSTRACT
Recent mobilization against core tenets of the liberal international order suggests
that international institutions lack sufficient societal legitimacy. We argue that these
contestations are part of a legitimation dynamic that is endogenous to the political
authority of international institutions. We specify a mechanism in which inter-
national authority increases the likelihood for the public politicization of inter-
national institutions. This undermines legitimacy in the short run, but also allows
broadening the justificatory basis of global governance: Politicization allows civil
society organizations (CSOs) to transmit alternative legitimation standards to global
elite discourses. We trace this sequence for four key institutions of global economic
governance – the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, and the NAFTA – combining data
on authority and protest counts with markers for CSOs and legitimation narratives
in more than 120,000 articles in international elite newspapers during 1992–2012.
The uncovered patterns are consistent with a perspective that understands legitim-
ation dynamics as an endogenous feature of international authority, but they also
show that alternative legitimation narratives did not lastingly resonate in the global
discourse thus far. This may explain current backlashes and calls for active re-legit-
imation efforts on part of international institutions themselves.
KEYWORDS
Legitimacy; legitimation; IMF; World Bank; WTO; NAFTA; politicization
Introduction
Contemporary world politics confronts the liberal international order with a funda-
mental tension. While most of today’s pressing societal challenges involve a strong
transnational dimension and can hardly be tackled by individual national govern-
ments alone, extant institutions of international cooperation face increasing societal
opposition in various parts of the world. The highly controversial public debates
on TTIP or TPP, the partially violent protests against the International Monetary
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Fund (IMF) during the Eurocrisis, and especially the electorally successful populist
mobilization against core tenets of institutionalized international cooperation on
both sides of the Atlantic are striking cases in point. What drives these backlashes
against international institutions?
Diverging national interests and economic contexts, specific incentives in domestic
political competition, or the vagaries of modern political communication clearly play
their part. However, this article argues that the contestation of international cooper-
ation goes beyond the interplay of such idiosyncratic factors in contained short-term
episodes. Rather, we claim, it should also be understood as endogenous to the polit-
ical authority international institutions have acquired during the last decades.
Our argument builds on the premise that the exercise of authority requires justi-
fication in modern societies (Forst, 2007). Institutions that produce collectively
binding decisions need to make credible claims on their right to rule. If these
claims do not match the beliefs and standards of those governed, the institutions
lose the widespread recognition they need for the effective implementation of their
decisions (Cerutti, 2011; Parsons, 1960; Suchman, 1995). Thus, the rise of political
authority is usually accompanied by permanent efforts to nurse and nurture the
beliefs in its legitimacy (Weber, 2013, p. 450). This link between expanding author-
ity and intensifying legitimation processes should also hold in global governance
(Brassett & Tsingou, 2011; Tallberg & Z€urn, 2018). We argue that it leads to pat-
terned dynamics that should be taken into account when assessing the societal
legitimacy of the current liberal international order.
We specify these dynamics as a causal mechanism that is triggered by the very
transfer of authority from national to international institutions. Higher levels of
international authority imply increasing societal intrusiveness of decision-making
beyond the nation state. This overstretches a narrow technocratic legitimation nar-
rative that solely resorts to effective, expertise-driven international cooperation. We
thus firstly expect that upsurges in the authority of international institutions
increase the intensity of de-legitimation attempts directed at them. Ceteris paribus,
higher levels of authority render the societal politicization of international institu-
tions more likely. We secondly expect that such intensifying public de-legitimation
efforts involve the articulation of more demanding narratives regarding the appro-
priate exercise of international authority. Ceteris paribus, public politicization
should increase the emphasis on fair outcomes and more open procedures of inter-
national decision-making. Yet, de-legitimation does not have to be the end point –
in principle we agree that ‘liberalism contains the seeds of its own salvation’
(Deudney & John Ikenberry, 2018, p. 18). We thirdly expect that politicization gen-
erates more access of civil society organizations (CSOs) to discourses among global
elites, rendering the transmission of alternative legitimation narratives possible.
Together, we argue, these three hypotheses form a distinct causal mechanism cap-
turing recurrent legitimation dynamics in global governance. Yet, these alternative
legitimation narratives have to lastingly resonate among global authority-holders in
order to prevent a widening gap between legitimacy beliefs and legitimacy claims
that makes nationalist backlashes more likely.
This perspective adds to extant scholarly views on the legitimacy of international
institutions in three ways. First, we deviate from the view that power shifts in the
international system are the only fundamental threat that the liberal international
order faces (Ikenberry, 2008; Stephen, 2014). Rather our argument emphasizes that
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threats to the legitimacy of international institutions also emerge from within the
societies in the traditional liberal ‘heartland’. Second, we deviate from the view that
international institutions can maintain favorable legitimacy beliefs solely by satis-
factory institutional performance along their original mandates (Dellmuth &
Tallberg, 2015; Keohane, Macedo, & Moravcsik, 2009). Rather, our argument sug-
gests that institutional performance has to be justified against the evolving evalu-
ative standards of those affected by this performance (Bernstein, 2011; Brassett &
Tsingou, 2011). And third, our argument deviates from perspectives that defy the
need for active re-legitimation by assuming that the wider citizenry is ‘rationally
ignorant’ toward international politics (Moravcsik, 2002). Even if the citizenry is
not following each and every international decision, the basic recognition that there
is political authority beyond the nation state creates a latent mobilization potential.
In this context, elite cues on governance beyond the nation state matter for
whether this latent mobilization potential turns into fundamental opposition
(Neuner, 2018; Schmidtke, 2018; Steenbergen, Edwards, & de Vries, 2007).
If our argument holds, solely explaining contemporary backlashes against the
liberal international order with particular institutional crises or specific set-ups
of domestic political competition falls too short. Understanding the dynamics
and contents of long-term legitimation processes is equally decisive for the
question whether favorable legitimacy beliefs about the international order can
be maintained (Brassett & Tsingou, 2011; Tallberg & Z€urn, 2018).
To substantiate these claims, the remainder of the article proceeds in four steps.
The subsequent section theorizes the authority–legitimation mechanism in greater
detail. The research design section then develops an empirical plausibility probe of
the mechanism. We translate the abstract argument to the context of global economic
governance. This keeps the set of legitimation demands manageable, focusses on a
key pillar of the liberal international order, and allows us to compare the theorized
sequence across four institutions with varying degrees of authority – the IMF, the
World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). We combine quantitative information on the inter-
national political authority with mediatized protest counts as a ‘tip-of-the-iceberg’
indicator for societal politicization. This is linked to the presence of CSOs and alter-
native legitimation narratives in institution specific discourses gathered through an
automated text analysis of 128,853 articles in transnational elite newspapers between
1992 and 2012. The analysis section shows that the macro patterns in these data are
consistent with a composite mechanism linking authority and its politicization to the
presence of CSOs and alternative legitimation narratives in elite discourses on global
economic governance. However, we also find that alternative legitimation narratives
do so far not lastingly resonate in the elite discourses we analyze. This, we conclude,
widens the gap between the societal need for international cooperation and the soci-
etal legitimacy of extant institutional arrangements further, contributing to the back-
lashes we observe.
The mechanism: authority, politicization, and legitimation
dynamics in global governance
The model of legitimation dynamics proposed here distills a causal mechanism that
leads from the authority of international institutions to their (de-)legitimation over
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time. Rather than isolating immediate bivariate relationships, mechanisms refer to
‘recurrent processes linking specified initial conditions to a specific outcome’
(Mayntz, 2004). Our understanding of such causal mechanisms includes both
recurrent sequences of events (composite mechanisms) that put relationships
between social facts in a broader context and linking mechanisms that describe the
social choices leading from one macro phenomenon to the next (Bennett &
Checkel, 2014; Bunge, 1997; Elster, 1989). The key recurring sequence in the
authority–legitimation mechanism we propose is summarized in Figure 1. It con-
sists of four composite steps (t1–t4) and three links (arrows a–c) that we will dis-
cuss in turn.
Composite step t1
The rise of international authority provides the initial trigger for the mechanism
we theorize. In the quest to solve particular transnational challenges, national gov-
ernments deliberately create such authority on the international level. They either
limit their unilateral policy options in international agreements, pool formerly
national powers in majority voting procedures at the international stage, or even
delegate sovereign competences to partially autonomous international institutions
(Blake & Payton, 2014; Haftel & Thompson, 2006; Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, &
Tierney, 2006; Hooghe & Marks, 2015). International authority emerges where
actors – initially mostly governments – recognize and accept, in principle or in
practice, that international institutions can make competent judgments or issue
binding decisions for the affected collective of states. Authority thus refers to the
deviation from individual state autonomy and it is a matter of degree. It varies
with the policy scope, the bindingness of rule-setting and interpretation, as well as
the depth of actual pooling and the delegation of formerly national competences in
international institutions (Z€urn, Tokhi, & Binder, 2018).
Link (a)
The more international institutions limit unilateral policies of individual govern-
ments, the broader is the set of societal interests that are directly affected by the
international authority. And the more intrusive international institutions are, the
more is at stake for those affected. This incentivizes more societal actors to direct
their political demands towards the institutions that now hold the relevant author-
ity. Learning processes as wells as re-orientations of material resources might be
Figure 1. The authority–legitimation mechanism.
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necessary before different societal interest mobilize effectively on international deci-
sion-making. But ceteris paribus, we expect that the broadening and deepening of
the international authority will be followed by a growing public awareness of inter-
national institutions and an intensification and differentiation of societal demands
directed at them.
Composite step t2
The resulting public mobilization of competing political preferences has been
labelled as the politicization of international institutions (Z€urn, Binder, & Ecker-
Ehrhardt, 2012). Recent literature traces evidence of such increasing politiciza-
tion in individual attitudes (Dellmuth, 2016; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012), mobilization
of interest groups (D€ur & Mateo, 2014; Ecker-Erhardt & Z€urn, 2013; Z€urn &
Walter, 2005), national partisan competition (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Hutter &
Grande, 2014; Rauh, 2015), national media (Rauh & B€odeker, 2016; Rixen &
Zangl, 2013; Schmidtke, 2018; Statham & Trenz, 2012), and protest events
(Della Porta & Tarrow, 2004; Uba & Uggla, 2011). The authority-politicization
nexus is often not direct and linear but rather mediated by specific events, pol-
icy crises, or particular national contexts (De Wilde & Z€urn, 2012; Hooghe &
Marks, 2009; Hutter & Grande, 2014). But despite mediating factors, the key
point is that higher levels of international authority will – on average – make it
more likely that international institutions are questioned or even contested in
the public domain.
Politicization challenges the standard legitimation narrative of institutionalized
international cooperation (Steffek, 2003, 2015). Traditionally, international institu-
tions are defended in a technocratic manner: aggregate welfare gains achieved along
credible intergovernmental commitments that resort to impartial coordination and
unbiased expertise initially provided sufficient justification – as least as long as
international institutions were based on the consent principle and mainly required
legitimacy among participating governments. This justification, however, becomes
quickly overburdened where international institutions hold authority on their own,
thus affecting societally relevant policy choices even beyond the immediate agree-
ment of affected national societies. Public debates involving a more diverse set of
societal stakeholders widen the political community that has to grant legitimacy to
international institutions, resulting in more complex standards along which inter-
national authority is evaluated (Bernstein, 2011; Scholte, 2011). With a widened
audience, we particularly expect that public contestation will feature the fairness of
outcomes and procedures more strongly than standards of technocratic efficiency.
Public politicization will thus initially involve the de-legitimation of inter-
national authority.
Link (b)
But the exposure of alternative legitimation narratives also entails the opportunity
to broaden the justificatory basis of international authority. A more widespread
debate makes both more affected actors heard which enables the mutual develop-
ment of political and justificatory alternatives for global choices. Yet, for this to
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happen the signal of exhausted legitimacy beliefs in domestic settings also needs to
be received by global decision-making elites. In this respect we argue that public
debates do not only create a supply of alternative narratives but also generate a
demand on part of the international authority-holders. Observing public politiciza-
tion, international officials should have incentives to cater to societal demands –
no matter whether we conceptualize them as policy-seekers, who care about effect-
ive implementation, or as office-seekers, who care about maintaining or expanding
competences (Rauh, 2016; Z€urn, 2014).
Composite step t3
Yet, international institutions hardly have direct accountability chains to the wider
public. The literature has rather repeatedly emphasized a key role of the organized
civil society for feeding societal demands into international institutions (Keck &
Sikkink, 1998; Scholte, 2004). Particularly transnationally organized groups mobiliz-
ing for causes beyond the immediate material interest of their members are seen as
the major ‘transmission belt’ capable of connecting the wider citizenry with global
decision-makers (Nanz & Steffek, 2004). Such CSOs are in the position to bundle
and to aggregate various societal demands that emerge in the diverse, often
national settings in which the politicization of international authority occurs.
Moreover, they are able to communicate both the malpractices and achievements
of international institutions back to the different audiences of modern global gov-
ernance. Both characteristics together make them strategically relevant interlocutors
for international authority-holders who face societal politicization (Tallberg,
Sommerer, Squatrito, & J€onsson 2013, esp. 101–2). We accordingly expect that
periods of pronounced politicization grant such CSOs greater access to inter-
national elite-level discourses. To meet the demands of their constituencies, we also
theorize that CSOs will use this opportunity to actively communicate alternative
standards of evaluating the legitimacy of international institutions. Accordingly
fairness- and participation-based narratives should gain prominence in the dis-
course of international authority holders alongside stronger CSO presence.
Links (c)
Civil society organization transmission of alternative evaluation criteria to global
elite discourses, however, is necessary but not sufficient for broadening the legitim-
ation base of global governance in the long run. Re-legitimation also requires that
international institutions themselves adopt and employ alternative narratives in
their efforts to justify their authority. In some instances, stronger communication
efforts framing institutional performance in the light of alternative standards might
be a sufficient response to declining legitimacy beliefs uncovered by politicization
and transmitted by CSOs. In other instances, however, policy or institutional
reforms may be needed to credibly claim that the standards of narratives emphasiz-
ing fairness of outcomes and procedures are met. In any case, adapting to more
complex legitimation demands is costly for international authority holders. Bearing
these costs might be rational under immediate politicization pressures, but the
more long-term incentives are less clear to predict. Where politicization pressures
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ensue for a sufficient amount of time, internalization or even persuasion regarding
alternative narratives may occur. But against temporarily more contained episodes
of politicization, a reversion to the traditional technocratic narrative might appear
as more attractive option.
Composite steps at t4
At the final step of the sequence, thus, two outcomes are theoretically tangible
which both directly feed back into the dynamic (along the dashed lines in
Figure 1). Either one could expect resonance of alternative narratives. Resonance
means that the discourse of authority holders lastingly features alternative justifica-
tory standards even beyond the immediate pressures from societal politicization or
CSO mobilization As such, resonance would accommodate societal mobilization
potential, decrease public politicization at step 2, and thus dampen the dynamics
we theorize here. Or authority holders avoid adaption cost when immediate polit-
ical pressures fade and rather revert to the well-worn technocratic narrative. This,
however, deepens the dissonance with the more encompassing legitimacy standards
in the affected societies in the long run. It would rather reinforce and amplify the
theorized mechanism. Where justificatory standards held in the affected societies
get repeatedly frustrated, contestation of international authority may take more
principled forms (cf. Easton, 1975). This strengthens those political forces that
emphasize national sovereignty over international cooperation thus limiting the
scope for further transfer of political authority to international institutions (cf.
Hooghe, Lenz, & Marks, 2019, Chapter 6).
To sum up, the mechanism conceptualizes a recurrent legitimation dynamic in
global governance. The pooling and delegation of formerly national political com-
petences make the politicization of international institutions more likely. In
response to public contestation, particularly transnationally organized CSOs can
gain access to elite-level discourses about global governance, which enables them to
transmit fairness- and participation-based legitimation narratives. To the extent
that these narratives find lasting resonance in elite-level discourses, re-legitimation
of international institutions appears feasible. In case authority holders do not last-
ingly incorporate such narratives in their legitimation efforts, however, de-legitim-
ation through politicization will intensify further, rendering more radical
opposition to international authority likely.
This sequence unfolds over time and contains endogeneity in two respects. On
the one hand, the mechanism stresses that the dynamics of de-legitimation and re-
legitimation are inherent to the authority of international institutions themselves.
On the other hand, the final steps open up one of two feedback loops: resonance
or dissonance mediate whether the theorized dynamic is dampened or becomes
self-reinforcing over time. To the extent that such an endogenous legitimation
dynamic is not only theoretically but also empirically plausible, explanations of the
societal legitimacy of institutionalized international cooperation can neither be
reduced to specific instances of domestic political competition nor to the features
of the respective international institution alone. Rather, a recurrent link between
international authority and a systematic broadening of legitimation demands sug-
gests that the interaction of societal de-legitimation and re-legitimation efforts of
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international authority holders have to be taken seriously when assessing the pros-
pects of institutionalized international cooperation.
Research design: tracing the mechanism in global
economic governance
The empirical evaluation of causal mechanisms requires more than an analysis of
the immediate relationships between input and output variables. Mechanisms
rather direct attention to the sequence of phenomena that link the trigger condition
to the outcome and the regularity of this sequence, thus aiming at a deeper explan-
ation of the outcome. Evaluating the proposed authority-legitimation mechanism
translates into three distinct empirical challenges. First, we want to establish that
the theorized legitimation dynamics are triggered by international authority itself.
This condition, however, varies only rarely for individual international institutions
and we expect that it unfolds its effects only slowly over time. Second, our mechan-
ism-based argument implies that each composite step increases the likelihood of
the subsequent one. However, the theoretical discussion has also highlighted vari-
ous scope conditions and complementary factors that may moderate or delay the
causal relationships implied by each linking step. Third, our argument describes a
long-term dynamic so that international authority, politicization, and the presence
of very specific legitimation narratives in international elite-level discourses need to
be operationalized consistently in a way that allows covering comparatively long-
time periods.
Against these empirical challenges, our ambition is nothing more but also noth-
ing less than a plausibility probe of the authority-legitimation mechanism
(Eckstein, 1975). To see whether our argument bears enough empirical plausibility
to warrant further attention, neither isolating the statistical effect of international
authority on some measure of legitimation intensity at fixed points in time2 nor
tracing the theorized sequence solely in individual case studies appears sufficient.
The former approach falls short of capturing the theorized causal sequence while
the latter approach falls short of showing that the theorized sequence operates
regularly and across institutions. Rather, we follow the idea that the empirical ana-
lysis of causal mechanisms has to combine cross-case comparison along variation
in the trigger condition with within-case inference focusing on temporal variation
along the theorized sequence (Goertz, 2017). Specifically, we compare four inter-
national institutions that operate with comparable legitimation narratives but
exhibit varying levels of authority. Then we offer systematic macro-level operation-
alizations of the mechanism’s four components – authority, politicization, transmis-
sion, and resonance/dissonance – that allow us to analyze their temporal variation
descriptively and in a set of structural equations capturing the theorized causal
pathway explicitly.
The cases: four institutions of global economic governance
Translating the abstract mechanism to a specific context, our empirical approach
focusses on global economic governance. Three considerations drive this choice.
First, institutional cooperation to manage economic interdependence is a
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cornerstone of the liberal international order as it has developed in recent decades.
Second, economic governance is a particularly relevant issue area for our argument
as it often resorts to technocratic management but has strong political effects by
determining the resources available for distribution in various other policy
domains. And third, the domain of global economic governance offers different
international institutions that should exhibit comparable legitimation narratives
while holding varying levels of political authority.
The transfer of political competences on economic governance to the global
realm took off with the 1944 Bretton Woods conference which aimed to establish a
post-war economic order that could prevent spirals of protectionism and currency-
devaluations. Against the experience of the Great Depression, the negotiations
revolved around enhanced international cooperation along open markets. The
resulting institutions – the IMF, the World Bank, later the WTO, and regional
trade agreements – have been equipped with significant political authority
since then.
The IMF was originally geared to ensure the stability of the international finan-
cial system by fostering cooperation in monetary and fiscal policy. It oversaw the
then fixed exchange rate agreements and provided short-term loans to countries
facing imbalances of payment. Despite the collapse of the fixed-rate system in
1971, the scope of IMF activities widened significantly during the 1980s in the light
of the accelerating interdependence of international money and finance (O’Brien,
Goetz, Scholte, & Williams, 2000, pp. 161–4). First, the IMF ventured into
enhanced surveillance of the international political economy. Assessing the eco-
nomic performance of the world as a whole through its biannual World Economic
Outlook and, more importantly, of individual governments through the Article IV
consultations, the Fund nowadays issues authoritative interpretations of economic
policy choices around the globe (Lombardi & Woods, 2008). Second, the Fund’s
monetary assistance moved from short-term loans to medium- and long-term
facilities geared toward structural adjustment of creditors’ economic systems. The
corresponding conditionality – i.e. the policy reforms expected from countries in
exchange for IMF resources – is strongly oriented along the Washington
Consensus, and revolves mainly around trade and foreign direct investment liberal-
ization, deregulation, privatization, and fiscal reform. In addition, the IMF’s efforts
to avert national debt defaults in various crises such as in Mexico (1994–5),
Southeast Asia (1997–8), Russia (1998), Brazil (1998), Argentina (1998–2002), and
more lately Greece (2010–15), have turned it into a powerful global lender of last
resort. Since IMF decisions are taken along weighted majority votes they go signifi-
cantly beyond the consent of individual governments, thus expressing inter-
national authority.
Its sister organization, the World Bank,3 should originally facilitate economic
growth and infrastructure reconstruction by providing capital investment loans
mainly to the war-torn European countries. After the 1947 Marshall Plan, the Bank
increasingly turned its attention to the developing world outside of Europe. It
defined long-term economic growth and poverty alleviation as its central purposes
and expanded its loan targets from physical infrastructure to other public services
such as education or rural development. Particularly since the 1980s, World Bank
loans are coupled with structural adjustment demands, which also focus primarily
on debt reduction and liberalization along the Washington Consensus. Similar to
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the IMF, these decisions are based on a weighted majority voting system. And like
the IMF, also the World Bank acquired epistemic authority over time. Since the
early 1970s, the Bank gathers and distributes structured data, and has developed
analytical expertise on national economic governance systems across the globe.
While these competences grant influence over economic policy choices of individ-
ual states, the World Bank’s overall authority should be somewhat lower compared
to the IMF, as its actions focus mainly on the developing world and volun-
tary projects.
The attempt to also establish an institution governing international trade initially
failed at Bretton Woods. However, the idea was revived in 1947 with the signature
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) leading to several rounds
of tariff reductions. With the Uruguay round initiated in 1986, the scope of nego-
tiations was considerably widened also to include a broader range of non-tariff
measures such as state subsidies, formerly strongly protected economic sectors such
as textiles and agriculture, as well as trade in services and intellectual property
rights. In 1994, this negotiation round resulted in the institutionalization of the
WTO. The organization provides a framework for continued intergovernmental
negotiation in regular ‘ministerial conferences’, generates and distributes informa-
tion on individual countries’ compliance with trade agreements, and – most
important – controls a mechanism to settle trade disputes and to enforce compen-
satory measures even against the will of individual governments (Barton, Goldstein,
Josling, & Steinberg, 2008). While the WTO thus also embodies significant levels of
political authority, the transfer of further competences has recently stalled. The
negotiations of the Doha round are blocked mainly by quarrels over agricultural
subsidies and diverging priorities of the developed and developing nations. As a
consequence, additional trade liberalization has moved towards bilateral and
regional agreements.
One prominent example of such agreements is the NAFTA. Compared to the
other three cases, NAFTA is an international institution with comparatively little
authority. It was negotiated among Canada, Mexico and the United States and
entered into force in 1994. Its major goal is stimulating economic growth through
increasing trade and foreign direct investment opportunities among the signatory
parties. It comes with a highly detailed set of mutual obligations on trade in goods
and services, investment, intellectual property rights, and it covers various non-tar-
iff barriers for economic exchange. NAFTA limits national regulatory autonomy to
some extent, has an own secretariat and also entails a limited dispute-settlement
mechanism. In this sense, NAFTA is clearly more than just an international treaty
(Hooghe & Marks, 2015). But compared to the other three institutions, the negotia-
tors took care to regulate most relevant instances ex ante rather than allowing for
pooled future decisions or actual delegation to a supranational organization
(Abbott, 2000). In result, NAFTA’s main decision-making body, the Free Trade
Commission, only acts by consensus and issues recommendations rather than bind-
ing measures while the dispute settlement mechanism resorts to external experts
and is designed to limit national sovereignty to the least possible extent (ibid).
Therefore, NAFTA is an international institution with a significantly lower level of
authority than the other three institutions. It is a contrasting case, in which we
expect the authority-legitimation mechanisms to be much less pronounced.4
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Taken together, these global economic governance institutions have acquired
political authority which, however, varies noticeably. The original narratives justify-
ing the transfer of formerly national economic policy competences to these four
international institutions are furthermore comparable. In all four cases, creating
international authority is justified with the overarching aim to stimulate stable eco-
nomic growth. This aim should be achieved through open markets with limited
governmental intervention which should be guaranteed through the expertise,
impartial coordination and efficient decision-making procedures that the created
institutions offer. In all four instances, the initial justificatory narrative thus boils
down to an expert-driven, effective management of exchange of economic resour-
ces across national borders.
The resulting international authority, however, addresses not only governments,
but also touches upon ‘behind-the-border’ issues (Kahler, 1995). The political
choices taken by or enshrined in the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO and NAFTA
in fiscal and monetary, in development, and in trade policy, invariably define the
budgetary and regulatory leeway of national governments. They thus constrain the
distribution of resources across different societal interests. In consequence, ‘each of
the international economic organizations is now involved in decision-making,
which directly affects local communities, interest groups, national domestic political
and economic arrangements, and also specific groups of countries’ (Woods &
Narlikar, 2001, p. 572). Along our argument, political authority with high intrusive-
ness should overtax a purely technocratic legitimation narrative thus triggering the
mechanism theorized above. To assess the plausibility of this mechanism, we then
require indicators for its main components that are consistently available for suffi-
ciently long periods.
Operationalizations: authority and (de)legitimation in mediatized
public discourses
We base our quantitative assessment of authority on the WZB International
Authority Database (Z€urn et al., 2018). It compares the formal competences of 36
institutions between 1949 and 2012. For each of seven stages in the policy cycle,
the project codes the level of authority conceptualized as an additive index of pool-
ing and delegation, weighted by bindingness and policy scope (supplementary
information Appendix A). This aggregate perspective mirrors the qualitative judg-
ments on variation in international authority above: especially the IMF ranks com-
paratively high in the upper third of the distribution, where it is mainly trumped
by general purpose organizations such as the EU or the UN only. Institutional
WTO authority is also comparatively high while the World Bank ranks somewhat
lower. We contrast these three IOs with NAFTA which only ends up in the lower
third of observed authority values in the sample of 36 IOs.
Note that this measure of institutionalized authority varies only rarely over time.
The major authority transfers to the IMF and the World Bank have occurred in
the 1980s already, with a minor increase of IMF authority during the Eurocrisis in
2011. After its founding in 1994, authority of the WTO has increased only once
with the instalment of the dispute settlement body in 1995. Likewise, as intended
during the original negotiations, authority of the NAFTA has remained limited and
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constant since its 1994 entry into force. Thus the subsequent analyses mainly
exploit cross-sectional variation and level effects of authority.
The second composite step in the theorized mechanism is politicization.
Particularly the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank are relatively prominent in
national media (Rauh & B€odeker, 2016) and in citizens’ minds (Ecker-Ehrhardt,
2012) when compared to other international institutions. They have also experi-
enced contentious public debates. Especially the ‘Battle of Seattle’ during the WTO
Ministerial Conference in 1999 and its continuation in the A16 protests during the
IMF/World Bank meetings in Washington in the following year stand out. They
are often seen as the birth of a transnational ‘anti-globalization movement’ contest-
ing both the substance and procedures of global economic governance (Smith,
2001). NAFTA experienced less politicization but was confronted with civil society
opposition and electoral contestation especially during its negotiation and ratifica-
tion phase (Millner, 1997, pp. 208–12; Vogel, 1995, pp. 234–9).
Beyond such anecdotal evidence, our plausibility probe requires a systematic
politicization indicator that is comparable over time and institutions. Politicization
is a multi-dimensional concept that can be observed in the public visibility and
awareness of international authority, the polarization of corresponding opinions
and positions, as well as the mobilization of a broadened set of societal actors (De
Wilde, 2011; Rauh, 2016; Z€urn et al., 2012). Since there is no longitudinal data that
would allow capturing all of these dimensions, our proxy resorts to mediatized pro-
test events addressing the four institutions under analysis. Given that protests
involve costly actions of a large number of individuals and require a minimum
level of organization before they get mediatized, we consider this as a ‘tip of the
iceberg’ measure. It systematically underestimates the overall level of politicization,
but this bias should be the same for all for institutions under analysis while offer-
ing reliability over time. We retrieve respective counts of mediatized IO-specific
protests from the TransAccess data set for the period 1969–2010 (Tallberg et al.,
2013, p. 102) and extend the coding scheme to cover the 2011–2 as well. These
data count yearly co-occurrences of keywords for protest actions in direct proxim-
ity to respective institution references in all articles in the LexisNexis ‘major world
newspapers’ (MWN) file. In other words, our politicization proxy captures acts of
societal resistance related to the four institutions, as they are publically reported in
more than 60, primarily domestic news outlets around the world.5
Consistent indicators for the transmission of alternative legitimation narratives–
the third composite step of the mechanism – are the most important, yet also most
challenging pieces of empirical information we require. Our proxy for this step
resorts to media sources as well. But while our politicization indicator is drawn
from domestic media sources, our data collection on global economic elite dis-
courses focuses on renowned quality newspapers with decidedly transnational audi-
ences and an explicit focus on global economic coverage. We assume that such
outlets are read by the traditional beneficiaries, proponents and authority holders
of internationalized economic integration and liberalization. We consider these
renowned newspapers as indicative for the elite discourses and juxtapose this elite
discourse with national quality papers as indicators for a broad public discourse.
To the extent that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can place their narra-
tives in this segmented elite part of the public sphere, they can be deemed
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successful in entering the debates among the holders and defenders of international
political authority.
There are three additional reasons to resort to these media sources in this step.
First, from the perspective of CSOs willing to hold international decision-makers to
account, presence in this segment of public media is of special importance since a
crucial part of the discourses between authority holders and important parts of the
societal audience mostly consist of indirect encounters in mediated public spheres
(Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Koopmans, 2004). Second, even where CSOs gain
more direct access to international institutions, their presence in public discourses
remains an asset as it signals sustained political pressure to decision-makers
(Beyers, 2004). And, third, even if CSOs actually influence international decisions,
such successes have to be communicated to establish accountability chains to the
CSOs constituency and the wider public more broadly (Nanz & Steffek, 2004;
Scholte, 2004).
Combining this conceptual choice with the pragmatic need to focus on English
language resources that are digitally available for a sufficient amount of time, our
newspaper sample contains the Financial Times (London, UK, roughly 426,000
daily copies in 2012), the New York Times (New York City, USA, 1,086,798 copies),
and the Straits Times (Singapore, 365,800 copies). These newspapers are selected
because they have a decidedly transnational readership, are all known widely
beyond their countries of origin, represent the three economically most important
world regions, share a global outreach in their reporting, operate large correspond-
ent networks across the globe, and extensively cover international politics
and business.
To put our findings into perspective, we add data from two more nationally ori-
ented newspapers with center-left political leanings. The Guardian is based in
London and sells currently about 175.000 copies a day. According to its self-
description, the Washington Post is the ‘standard breakfast-time reading for mem-
bers of Congress, diplomats, government officials, journalists, business lobbyists
and lawyers in Washington’ and sells about 400,000 copies. These two sources
serve as more domestic and politically more skeptical control group allowing us to
see how different the discourses of global economic elites in the other three sources
are.
From these newspapers we then manually retrieved all 128,853 articles that refer
at least once to one of the four global economic governance institutions between
1992 and 2012 (supplementary information Appendix B). Table 1 summarizes the
article sample. The distribution shows a dominance of the Financial Times in
reporting about global economic governance organizations, which can be explained
out of particularly strong business focus of this outlet. Regarding the four covered
Table 1. Distribution of newspaper articles.
IMF World Bank WTO NAFTA Total
Transnat. elite NPs Financial Times 26,603 15,167 15,008 2531 59,309
New York Times 7982 5842 4743 3275 21,842
The Straits Times 4008 3332 4326 438 12,104
38,593 24,341 24,077 6,244 93,255
More nat. controls The Guardian 6626 4729 3612 538 15,505
Washington Post 6374 6722 3707 3290 20,093
51,593 35,792 31,396 10,072 128,853
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institutions, the IMF receives most journalistic attention followed by the World
Bank, the WTO and, way further down the line, the NAFTA.
Having inspected this corpus we refrain from taking the full article texts as the
unit of analysis as they often deal with a variety of issues and mention the respect-
ive institution only once or twice. In order to ensure that the retrieved variables
are plausibly associated with the institutions of interest, the analyses cover the
immediate five-sentence context around references to one of the four institutions.
Within these text pieces we then need to capture the presence of CSOs and a
references to legitimation narratives. To handle this in a text corpus of this volume
we resort to a dictionary-based approach of automatic text classification. This
approach sorts individual text pieces into a priori set categories based on the pres-
ence or the relative frequency of specific keywords or phrases. Like all automated
content analyses, dictionary-based approaches face a trade-off between efficiency
and reliability on the one hand, and the valid operationalizations on the other.
Dictionary-based approaches in particular are limited to those literal language pat-
terns that the researcher passes to the algorithm. Since we hardly can fully antici-
pate all ways in which a newspaper may refer to the concepts of theoretical
interests, our approach is a conservative estimation of the presence of evaluative
standards and actors in the debate about global economic governance. Yet, this
affects all categories alike, can be assumed to be stable over time, and avoids add-
itional assumptions of unsupervised text classification algorithms.
We tackle the validity challenge with three additional steps. First, we develop
very encompassing dictionaries and flexibilize them by using regular expressions.
Second, we validated and extended the individual terms and phrases in the diction-
aries through an intense back-and-forth between close readings of secondary litera-
ture and individual articles in the corpus, various keyword-in-context (KWIC), co-
occurrence, and co-location analyses of individual dictionary terms. Third and
finally, we fully lay all used dictionaries open and set up interactive tools by which
skeptical readers can assess themselves whether individual terms and phrases affect
our results.6
To capture the presence of CSOs, we start from lists of all NGOs ever accredited
to a WTO ministerial conference and, more importantly, all organizations in the
Civil Society Database provided by the United Nations (UN) Department of
Economic and Social Affairs. After extensive cleaning, our resulting dictionary con-
tains more than 25,000 unique entries. This provides a rather encompassing repre-
sentation of non-governmental groups that have ever tried to gain access to global
governance institutions. A tagging script then automatically counts the occurrences
of each group within the five-sentence contexts around each institutional reference
in the newspaper corpus. To identify the theoretically relevant CSOs – that is,
groups representing and mobilizing for causes beyond the immediate material
interests of their membership – we manually classified all groups that actually
appeared in the corpus to exclude other types of non-governmental actors such as
business representations, unions, or think tanks (see supplementary information
Appendix C for details).
To capture the presence of legitimation narratives we start from the scholarly lit-
erature of civil society mobilization on global economic governance. The concise
overviews of publically articulated discontent with the four institutions provided by
O’Brien et al. (2000), Scholte and Schnabel (2002), Della Porta and Tarrow (2004),
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as well as Wallach (2002) indeed show that civil society actors invoke fairness-
based demands that stretch beyond the technocratic legitimation narrative of global
economic governance. Civil society challengers doubt that the rules and measures
in and by the NAFTA, the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO are beneficial for
societies as a whole. Rather, they emphasize detrimental side effects of global eco-
nomic governance on environmental policies, public debt, social equality, poverty,
and human rights protection. In addition, civil society mobilization against global
economic governance also points to insufficient procedural justifications of inter-
national authority. Rather than judging the institutions along their effectiveness
and expertise, civil society discontent addresses democratic standards and participa-
tory narratives by criticizing biased voting rules of the IMF and the World Bank or
disproportional negotiation powers of the developed countries in the WTO and the
NAFTA. Corresponding demands are more equal participation, greater transpar-
ency, as well as mechanisms of societal accountability. Also in this way, civil society
deviates from the technocratic legitimation narrative of international authority.
Table 2 summarizes these patterns of legitimation and de-legitimation.
To translate these (de-)legitimation standards into a text analysis dictionary we
first automatically marked all pieces of text in which key terms of traditional justi-
fications and main challenger demands occurred (e.g. ‘growth’, ‘social equality’,
‘expertise’, ‘transparency’). We then read a random sample of about 50 articles
from this reduced corpus. This exercise indicated that relying on single terms
results in an inacceptable amount of false positives (consider examples such as
‘equal market access’, ‘growth in sales’, etc.). We thus consecutively refined the dic-
tionary in an iterative process between deriving more specific phrases from the
sample texts, screen the corresponding output of KWIC analyses, re-applying the
search, and then re-reading similar subsamples of the retrieved texts. This iterative
procedure results in the expressions provided in supplementary information
Appendix D, which we finally used to classify references to different legitim-
ation narratives.
These measurements for the presence of both, CSOs and alternative legitimation
narratives then allow us to operationalize the final two steps of the theorized mech-
anism. We can observe the theorized transmission (step 3) if CSOs and alternative
narratives co-occur in the elite discourse after high politicization periods. And we
can observe the theorized resonance (step 4) if the alternative narratives remain
present in elite discourse even when the more immediate pressures of politicization
and CSO activity fade away. In contrast, we would speak of dissonance if the elite
discourse reverts to the technocratic narrative – especially in comparison to our
control group of more domestic discourses. Taking all these indicators together, we




Spur economic growth Poverty alleviation Equal participation
Stabilize and open markets Debt relief Transparency
Liberalization/privatization Social equality Accountability
Efficiency, reliability, expertise Environmental protection
Human rights
Note: Authors’ summary based on Della Porta and Tarrow (2004), O’Brien et al. (2000), Scholte and
Schnabel (2002), and Wallach (2002).
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can then assess in how far the legitimation dynamics in elite-level discourses about
global economic governance between 1992 and 2012 are consistent with the theor-
etical mechanism developed in the theory section above.
Analysis: patterns in politicization, CSO presence
and legitimation narratives
We start with a descriptive analysis of cross-sectional and temporal co-variation
patterns. Link (a) in the theorized mechanism implies that more political authority
of international institutions (step 1) renders the societal politicization of inter-
national institutions (step 2) more likely. Comparing across institutions, the annual
investigation-period averages of mediatized protests counts (dashed lines in
Figure 2) during the 21-year-period are by and large consistent with this argument.
While they indicate relatively high average levels of politicization for the high-
authority institutions WTO, IMF, and World Bank, mediatized protest counts for
the NAFTA – the institution with the lowest level of authority in our sample – are
hardly discernible in this comparison.7
Yet, we also observe sizeable variation over time. With regard to the three more
authoritative global economic governance institutions, our protest data initially
highlight the 1999 Battle of Seattle. The subsequent protest wave slowly levelled out
until 2005 in the case of the IMF and the World Bank. The WTO – probably due
to the conflicts over the deepening of the organization in the Doha round –
Figure 2. Politicization of global economic governance institutions as captured in domestically mediatized
protest counts.
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experienced a second, but weaker episode of politicization which levelled out until
2010. Yet in none of these three cases, the mean protest level fell back to its pre-
1999 levels.8 Consistent with the one-shot transfer of limited authority to the
NAFTA, this institution experienced transnationally observable protest mainly in
1993 during the ratification of the original agreement.
According to link (b) in our mechanism, upsurges in such public politicization
(step 2) should lead to the transmission of alternative narratives by CSOs (step 3).
Politicization should thus initially be positively related to an increased presence of
CSOs in transnational elite level discourse. In this regard, we initially have to note
that the presence of CSOs in transnational elite-level newspapers is rather low in
total. Although we look for 25.00 organizations, we detect CSO presence only in
between 1.2% and 2.9% of all institution-specific articles. The sample of present
CSOs is furthermore heavily skewed in favor of very few, well-endowed, and
transnationally organized CSOs of Western origin (Thrall, Stecula, & Sweet, 2014),
most notably Oxfam, Transparency International, Greenpeace, Christian Aid, and
the World Wide Fund for Nature (more detail in supplementary information
Appendix E).
For evaluating our mechanism, however, the decisive issue is whether this CSO
presence varies with the observed patterns of politicization. Figure 3 plots the
annual shares of institution-specific articles with CSO presence. We see that the
slightly enhanced protests against NAFTA in 1993 and 1997 coincide with local
peaks in the presence of CSOs in respective reports published by elite newspapers.
More strikingly, we observe that the high politicization period from 1999 to 2005
onwards is matched by higher CSO presence in elite-level reporting on the World
Bank, but also on the WTO and the IMF. The shares of corresponding articles that
made reference to a CSO almost doubles for these institutions during the period
with more pronounced protest activity. This pattern is consistent with step 3 of the
mechanism we propose.
But we also see that politicization works neither as the only trigger of CSO pres-
ence nor like an on/off switch. Especially in reporting on the IMF and the World
Bank, some CSO presence can already be detected before the high protest phase in
1999. Moreover, politicization does not have an immediate but probably a delayed
effect: presence of CSOs seems to increase slowly and, for the three more authorita-
tive IOs in our sample, peaked between 2003 and 2006 after they had experienced
a number of years with sustained politicization already. We arguably leave out a
range of unobserved factors - such as the World Bank’s reliance on CSOs in pro-
ject implementation, for example – but the patterns are still consistent with a posi-
tive but lagged relationship of domestic politicization and CSO presence in elite-
level discourses (link b in the mechanism).
Step 3 in our mechanism (transmission), however, also requires that the pres-
ence of CSOs is also linked to an increased presence of alternative legitimation nar-
ratives. Figure 4 thus plots the relative share of our respective dictionary-based
markers. This aggregate perspective initially confirms the expected dominance of
the technocratic legitimation narrative directed at growth stimulation through effi-
cient, expertise-driven procedures. Across the 21 years covered, this narrative
accounts on average for more than 60% of the articles in which our dictionary
found at least one narrative marker. The alternative fairness narrative – focusing
on issues such as poverty alleviation, fair distribution of wealth, and, to some
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extent, environmental and human rights concerns – figures in the covered elite dis-
course as well, but to a much lesser extent than in our control group of more left-
leaning, domestic newspapers (supplementary information Appendix G). This sup-
ports our assumption, that de-legitimation intensity is much higher in domestic
debates than in the discourses of transnational economic elites. References to the
participatory narrative pointing to standards such as equal representation, transpar-
ency, and accountability can be detected, too, but the overall amount of respective
references is rather marginal.
For evaluating the association between politicization and the transmission of
alternative narratives (link b in our mechanism), again, variation in these patterns
over time is decisive. The dominance of the technocratic legitimation narrative is
most pronounced for the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank before the change of
the century. With increasing politicization during and after the Battle of Seattle,
however the relative presence of alternative narratives becomes more pronounced
as well. The fairness narrative then makes up around 50% of articles with legitim-
ation markers. Although on a much lower level, markers for the participatory nar-
rative in the reports on the three most authoritative global economic organizations
figure only after this intense politicization period. There is still considerable fluctu-
ation but in line with step 3 of our mechanism it should be noted that CSOs seem
to matter: those years that indicate a high presence of CSOs in Figure 3 tend to be
also the years that indicate a particularly high intensity of alternative narratives in
Figure 4. Across all 80 IO-years covered, the correlation between the average pres-
ence of CSOs and alternative legitimation narratives is 0.55.
Figure 3. Presence of CSOs in the elite newspaper corpus.
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These indicators can then also be leveraged to analyze step 4 in our mechanism.
Recall that we would speak of resonance if the alternative narratives remain preva-
lent in the elite discourse even if the short-term pressures from public politicization
and CSO presence fade away. Yet, in the later years with less CSO presence, we
observe a decline in the presence of alternative legitimation standards. This leads
to a clear descriptive conclusion with regard to the final juncture of our mechan-
ism: we find little evidence for an independent resonance of alternative narratives
in the transnational elite discourse we cover here.
This lack of resonance is particularly striking when we compare the three trans-
national elite newspapers to our control group of the two more nationally oriented
and center-left leaning newspapers. In the Washington Post and especially in The
Guardian, both the presence of CSOs and the references to the fairness-based nar-
rative are significantly and almost consistently higher throughout the whole investi-
gation period and all four global economic governance institutions (supplementary
information Appendix G). As such, the descriptive evidence implies that step 4 of
our mechanism empirically materialized in dissonance rather than resonance.
Along our theoretical argument this should intensify rather than dampen the
authority–legitimation dynamics further.
But although resonance has not been happening along our measures, the evi-
dence thus far is consistent with the first three steps of the theorized authority–le-
gitimation mechanism. But how robust are these descriptives against the
unexplained variation we observe as well? To push our analysis one step further,
Figure 4. Relative yearly share of legitimation narratives in the elite newspaper corpus.
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we finally assess the correlational relationships among our annual observations.
Rather than treating authority, societal politicization, and CSO presence as inde-
pendent factors explaining the presence of alternative legitimation narratives in
elite discourse, however, we focus on the internal consistency of our claim and
explicitly analyze a path model (Wright, 1921) by jointly estimating the following
set of structural equations:
POLITICIZATIONio;year ¼ a  AUTHORITYio;year þ epoliticization;io;year (1)
CSOPRESENCEio;year ¼ b  POLITCIZATIONio;year þ ecsopresence;io;year (2)
ALTNARRATIVEio;year ¼ c  CSOPRESENCEio;year þ ealtnarrative;io;year
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(3)
ALTNARRATIVEio;year ¼ u  POLITICIZATIONio;year þ ealtnarrative;io;year (4)
ALTNARRATIVEio;year ¼ v  AUTHORITYio;year þ ealtnarrative;io;year (5)
Equations (1)–(3) model the theorized indirect effect of international authority
on the intensity of alternative legitimation narratives running through politicization
in the wider society and CSO presence in elite discourses. With Equations (4) and (5),
we control for possible direct effects of politicization and authority.
Estimating such a model against the data we have is quite demanding. As noted,
the authority of the four institutions varies mainly in the cross section so that
Equations (1) and (5) estimate mainly level effects and can, strictly speaking, not
rule out effects of other institutional idiosyncrasies. In addition, there are no
authority observations for the WTO and the NAFTA prior to 1994 so that we lose
a total of four institution-years. And since we have seen above that the presence of
CSOs as well as markers for the fairness-based and especially for the participatory
narrative are comparatively rare events we aggregate our daily observations to the
annual level and add incidences of fairness-based and participatory narratives into
a common indicator for the presence of alternative legitimation narratives. We
then pool the observations for the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, and the
NAFTA which leaves us in total with 80 observations available for estimation.
Finally, given their skews the three dependent variables were log-transformed (sup-
plementary information Appendix F).
Given this high level of aggregation and the fact that we cannot systematically
control all factors that might impinge on protests, CSO presence and the intensity
of alternative legitimation narratives, the overall low fit of this estimation is unsur-
prising.9 But despite a high level of noise, the theorized pathway markedly
improves the explained variance over taking only bivariate relations into account.
Most importantly the patterns of co-variation in the structural model plotted in
Figure 5 are consistent with the sequential nature of legitimation dynamics we the-
orize. There are positive and statistically significant coefficients along the pathway
with the links a–b–c that we have theorized above. A one standard-deviation
increase in the IO authority index is on average associated with a .48 standard-
deviation increase in our politicization proxy protest counts. One standard devi-
ation more on this latter measure is then associated with 0.33 standard deviations
more in the share of CSOs present in the elite discourse on global economic gov-
ernance we cover here. One standard deviation more on this variable then is linked
to a 0.51 standard deviation increase in the share of alternative narratives in this
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discourse. Due to the various unobserved disturbances and possibly lagged effects,
the co-variances with authority become weaker throughout the path but still
amount to an indirect effect of 0.08 standard deviations along a–b–c route that is
statistically significant at the five percent level in our limited annual data.
Neither politicization, as culminated in protest counts, nor varying levels of
authority alone can account for an increasing share of alternative legitimation nar-
ratives in transnational elite newspapers. The negative direct tendency of the
authority variable supports the baseline expectation that the technocratic narrative
provides the fallback option of justifying global economic governance organizations
in the transnational elite newspapers under analysis.
In sum, the descriptive as well as the correlational data presented in this section
are consistent with the theoretical argument that politicization and CSO presence
account for an indirect, positive effect of the amount of international authority on
the broadening of its justificatory discourse. Though less robust, these relationships
also hold in a replication excluding the NAFTA case as the only regional institu-
tion in our sample (supplementary information Appendix H). We also find, how-
ever, that the alternative legitimation narratives transmitted by this process did so
far not lastingly resonate in the elite discourse we cover here.
Discussion and conclusions
This article starts from the observation the prospects of successful political cooper-
ation though international institutions are impaired by a current wave of pro-
nounced political resistance in the societies they affect. Rather than treating such
instances of contested global governance only as idiosyncratic and temporarily lim-
ited events, we argue that more complete explanations of these phenomena should
Figure 5. Path analysis results.
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take more long-term legitimation dynamics into account as well. Specifically, we
suggest that the growing recognition of the political authority contemporary inter-
national institutions control renders the traditional, technocratic way of justifying
them insufficient. This makes the societal politicization of international institutions
more likely. Yet, the more complex demands articulated through this politicization
do not necessarily have to lead to a lasting de-legitimation of international institu-
tions. Where politicization amasses enough pressure, we argue, especially trans-
nationally organized CSOs become a more sought-after interlocutor, thereby
enabling them to transmit alternative narratives to the discourses of international
authority holders. To the extent that these new narratives lastingly resonate, the
opportunity to re-legitimate the exercise of authority by international institutions
opens up.
To assess the empirical plausibility of this mechanism, we focused on four key
institutions of global economic governance – the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO and
the NAFTA. We scrutinize macro-level quantitative data on the institution’s authority,
corresponding public protests, and the presence of CSOs and alternative legitimation
markers in IO-specific reports in international business elite newspapers between 1992
and 2012. Clearly, our empirical results do not allow immediate generalization. We
propose a mechanism that slowly unfolds over long time periods, we cannot explicitly
control all alternative explanations at each link of the mechanism, and we look at
highly aggregated data only. Yet, especially four findings in the co-variational patterns
of the macro-level indicators we have scrutinized suggest that proposed mechanism is
also empirically plausible enough to warrant further attention.
First, the patterns are consistent with the claim that higher international author-
ity is on average associated with higher levels of domestic politicization. The aggre-
gate protest counts clearly discriminate the three high-authority institutions from
the contrasting low-authority case. Second, higher levels of politicization are associ-
ated with a stronger presence of CSOs in the discourses about the four institutions
in global elite newspapers. We also do observe, however, that this mainly benefits a
few, well-endowed groups of Western origin. Third, a higher presence of CSOs
goes together with more alternative legitimation narratives in the elite-level dis-
course. The technocratic narrative, as present in references to the aim of stimulat-
ing economic growth through efficient and credible procedures, remains dominant
in the international business press throughout the investigation period. But once
CSOs gain presence in the wake of high politicization periods, markers of fairness-
based narratives highlighting social justice, poverty alleviation, or environmental
concerns increase as well. These findings are consistent with the endogenous legit-
imation mechanism we theorize, which is further bolstered by a path analysis on
the annual aggregates of our data. Fourth, however, we find that alternative legit-
imation dynamics have not lastingly resonated in the elite discourse we study.
Once protests and corresponding CSOs presence decay in the short term, the rela-
tive dominance of the technocratic legitimation narrative increases again.
In a benign reading, one may interpret this lack of resonance as a successful
accommodation of societal critique by substantial changes in policy or institutional
design. However, this seems implausible for two reasons. First, we do not really
observe corresponding reforms during our investigation period. Once ratified,
NAFTA was hardly changed at all. Reforms in the WTO essentially did not take
place as evident in the failed Doha round. The IMF changed its institutional design
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and policies in response to the financial crisis, but too late to be seen as a response
to the high politicization period. Only the World Bank enacted some reforms
regarding project participation CSOs and the incorporation of environmental issues
(Nielson & Tierney, 2003; Rodrik, 2006; Weidner, 2013). But even for this organ-
ization, doubts about these reforms remain strong (Weaver, 2009). Second, and
more importantly, reforms or policy changes would only contribute to re-legitim-
ation if international elites would also actually employ alternative narratives to jus-
tify international authority. This is clearly not reflected in our data, however.
In this light, our findings call for more detailed research on the final stage of
the theorized mechanism: why and when do international institutions lastingly
adopt alternative narratives to justify their authority (for recent efforts see
Dingwerth, Schmidtke, & Weise, 2015; Rocabert, Schimmelfennig, Winzen, &
Crasnic, 2018; Schmidtke, 2018)? Resonance of alternative legitimation narratives
seems to depend on further scope conditions. We can think of three such condi-
tions in particular. First, to the extent that resonance depends on internalization of
alternative narratives on part of authority holders, the amount of time for which
political pressure is sustained becomes an important variable (Checkel, 2005). If
this is true, the current wave of political resistance against international institutions
may also increase the incentives for active re-legitimation efforts. Second, adoption
of alternative justifications may significantly depend on the material and strategic
resources of the CSOs transmitting them (Kelley, 2004; Schimmelfennig &
Sedelmeier, 2005; Tallberg et al., 2013). Also in this regard the current wave of pol-
iticization might induce more re-legitimation by incentivizing a broader set of
groups to mobilize in favor of institutionalized international cooperation. Third,
the organizational structure of the institution in authority should be conducive to
learning (Reinold, 2017). These speculations may indeed explain why in the case of
the World Bank, the resonance of alternative legitimation narratives is higher, has
started earlier and has been accompanied by some reforms. The World Bank
depends more strongly on cooperation with CSO networks and it is credited with a
comparatively flat organizational structure that has significant reflexive capacities
(Moschella & Vetterlein, 2016; Reinold, 2016).
In any case, our plausibility probe highlights that future research along these
lines is theoretically and politically relevant. Contrasting the lacking resonance of
alternative narratives in elite discourses, we find that in particular references to the
fairness of outcomes continue to play a more prominent role in the more left-lean-
ing, and national newspapers we have exploited as a control group (supplementary
information Appendix G). While they are not internalized in global elite discourse,
respective demands are still virulent and create politicization potential. This sug-
gests that the authority-legitimacy gap has not been bridged yet.
The outcome of this mismatch is disillusioning. The evidence for a by now
severe legitimacy crisis of international authorities especially in the economic realm
is overwhelming. The ongoing rise of right-wing populist parties in Western
democracies – among them key beneficiaries of the extant liberal order – is the
most visible expression of this development. These thriving platforms have two
things in common: they all emphasize popular sovereignty and share a generalized
rejection of international authority. To the extent that such right-wing populist
gain power or lure other parties into taking up their agenda, they effectively push
back institutionalized decision making in the international realm. The Trump
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administration, for instance, seems to ignore the WTO completely. Similarly, many
European governments equate authority with control over national borders. Even
those more or less authoritarian populist leaders that govern economies that have
gained or stand to gain most from open economic borders fiercely attack the inter-
national institutions in this domain for double standards and inequality. India,
Turkey, and Poland are well-known examples. In this way, public politicization
may hamper the further pooling and delegation of political competences in the
international realm (Hooghe et al., 2019, Chapter 6).
Two indicators underline this growing mobilization potential against inter-
national authority further (Figure 6). The data in the left panel show the vote
shares of authoritarian populist parties10 in the 20 OECD founding members, that
is, states that have in principle committed to the institutions of embedded liberal-
ism. While there is notable cross-sectional variation, we see that the electoral sup-
port is on average increasing across the last four decades in these states. Moreover,
it has accelerated in the last 10 years for which our data indicate that international
institutions turned again more strongly to purely technocratic legitimation patterns.
The number and outcome of referendums about international cooperation
(Walter, Dinas, Jurado, & Konstantinidis, 2018) in the right panel of Figure 6 show
a similar pattern. Again, the data point to increasing societal dissatisfaction with
governance arrangements beyond the nation state and are indicative of a legitimacy
crisis. Popular votes on international cooperation and integration have not only
become more common over time but also face increasing opposition at the bal-
lot box.
Crucially, the arguments and findings presented in this article suggest that this
nationalist backlash is also related to endogenous legitimation dynamics in global
governance. Beyond the need to dig deeper into the micro linkages of the mechan-
ism we propose, the major implication of the composite argument and the patterns
presented in this article is that societal resistance to international cooperation
should not only be attributed to exogenous policy crises or specific set-ups of
domestic political competition alone. Rather, our findings make it plausible to
Figure 6. Indicators for the declining societal legitimacy of global governance.
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claim that this resistance is also rooted in the insufficient legitimation of the polit-
ical authority that contemporary international institutions control.
Notes
1. This work benefits from the inputs of various colleagues. We thank the participants of a
series of workshops at University of Stockholm and the WZB Berlin Social Science on
Legitimacy and Legitimation of IOs for excellent discussions. Moreover, the participants
of the workshop “Transnational Advocacy, Public Opinion, and the Politicization of
International Organizations” at the 43rd ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Warsaw,
April 2015, participants of the CIS colloquium at University of Z€urich in May 2016, and
members of WZB Global Governance Colloquium in July 2016 as well as other colleagues
from the WZB have provided many helpful comments. We are especially grateful to Jan
Beyers, Lisa Dellmuth, Marcel Hanegraaff, Macartan Humphreys, Ruud Koopmans,
Dorothea K€ubler, Daniel Maliniak, Wolfgang Merkel, Frank Schimmelfennig, Jonas
Tallberg, and Mike Tierney. We also appreciate research assistance by Luisa Braig,
Rebecca Majewski, Daniel Salgado-Moreno and Pavel Satra. Replication data are available
at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/FZ1HZR.
2. For approaches in this vein see Schmidtke (2018), Rauh (2016), or Rixen and
Zangl (2013).
3. When referring to the World Bank, we primarily mean the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which is part of the now broader World
Bank Group.
4. NAFTA differs from the other three cases also in with regard to its more confined
geographical scope. Note, however, that this does not directly disqualify it as a
comparative case for the theorized authority-politicization nexus. A smaller
geographical scope also implies lower authority since a more limited set of societal
actors is affected on average. Yet, one may argue that regional agreements are
qualitatively different on other, unobserved dimensions. In order to ensure that our
findings are not solely driven by the NAFTA case we initially present our descriptive
results for each institution separately. We furthermore replicate our correlational
analyses on a sample excluding the NAFTA case (see below).
5. For the full set of sources see http://w3.nexis.com/sources/scripts/grpInfo.pl?237924
(last accessed: December 9 2016)
6. Available via www.christian-rauh.eu/geg-corpus-explorer (last accessed: 05.09.2017).
7. WTO mean: 64.24 mediatized protests per year (SD: 99.2); IMF: 26.29 (68.78);
WBANK: 32.19 (69.49); NAFTA: 1.85 (2.89).
8. There are some indications that the role of the IMF in the Eurocrisis and the
imposition of austerity policies on the Greek government in 2015 and the following
years may be the exception to this.
9. The residual variances are .75 for politicization, .87 for CSO presence, and
.68 for alternative legitimation narratives.
10. In identifying such parties we follow the party classifications provided by Inglehart
and Norris (2016, p. 44) and Norris (2005, pp. 52–4) and collect the corresponding
vote shares from the ParlGov Database (D€oring & Manow, 2018).
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